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INTRODUCTION 
 
A new challenge for national legislation and law enforcement organs 
is basing certain directives on the model of complete harmonization. It is a 
source of inspiration owing to the fact that it will have a strong impact on 
the  enforcement  of  contract  law.  European  Parliament  and  Council 
Directive  2005/29  concerning  unfair  business-to-consumer  commercial 
practices  in  the  internal  market  and  amending  Council  Directive 
84/450/EEC,  Directives  97/7/EC,  98/27/EC  and  2002/65/EC  of  the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 
of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  forms  a  common  legal 
framework  for  the  whole  European  Union  in  relation  to  issues  of 
commercial practices applied by traders in sales and the promotion of goods 
and  services.  The  essence  of  the  Directive  consists  of  a  general  ban  on 
unfair  practices.  The  substantive  aspect  of  the  legal  solutions  means  the 
Member States cannot derogate the transposition process, so there shall be 
no modification of the level of protection in domestic law provided by the 
Directive. The material has been limited to the Court's interpretation of the 
2005 Directive. This is the first legislative solution in EU law regulating the 
integrity of the sphere of fair market practices, aimed directly at consumers. 
The conclusions of the legal ruling may be a valuable guideline for national 
legislation and jurisprudence, and a contribution to legal discourse. 
 
 
I. 
 
In  connection  with  the  reliance  of  the  Directive  on  the  complete 
harmonization  clause,  significant  difficulties  appear  in  the  practical 
application of the transposed legislation1. The question is raised of the more 
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precisely defined scope of Directive on unfair B2C commercial practices, 
while at the same time the boundaries of national derogations are set out in 
detail - effective in all conditions - allowing for a comprehensive ban. These 
issues concern the judgment of the Court on 9 November 2010 (C-540/08). 
The reference for a preliminary ruling stems from an application for interim 
relief made by Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co 
KG,  in  which  it  seeks  an  injunction  against  ￖsterreich-Zeitungsverlag 
GmbH  for  anti-competitive  use  of  a  bonus  in  principle  unlawful  under 
national law in the form of a competition prize. The Mediaprint Zeitungs- 
und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co KG case is the third in a series of 
references  in  which  national  courts  ask2  the  Court  whether  national 
prohibitions of combined offers are compatible with Directive 2005/29. One 
of the main questions which distinguishes the present case from previous 
ones, and which must therefore be the subject of careful legal consideration, 
is whether such an examination of compatibility is also possible where the 
purported regulatory objective of the national provision in question is to 
protect both media diversity and competitors. 
 
 
II. 
 
The dispute in the main proceedings concerns a situation in which 
the daily newspaper ‘ￖsterreich’, belonging to the defendant in the main 
proceedings,  organised  the  election  of  the  ‘footballer  of  the  year’  and 
invited the public to join in that competition, by internet or by means of a 
voting slip appearing in a 2007 edition of the newspaper. Participation in 
that competition gave the possibility of winning the prize of dinner with the 
footballer chosen. Considering that that possibility of gain, subject to the 
purchase of the newspaper, constituted an unlawful bonus for the purposes 
of  Paragraph  9a(1)(1)  of  the  UWG3,  Mediaprint  applied  to  the 
Handelsgericht Wien for an injunction against the defendant in the main 
                                                                                                                            
literature cited therein. The present model also does not mean that this process will cover 
all legal solutions and relevant aspects,  Delphine Lahet, Fr￩d￩rique Julienne, ‘La Directive 
europ￩enne sur les contrats de cr￩dit aux consommateurs: quelles opportunit￩s pour les 
consommateurs europ￩ens et les op￩rations transfronti￨res?’ (2010) 2 Revue Internationale 
de Droit Economique 185. 
2 Case C-261/07 VTB-VAB NV v Total Belgium NV [2009] and C-299/07 Galatea BVBA v 
Sanoma  Magazines  Belgium  NV  [2009]  ECR  I-2949;  C-304/08  Plus 
Warenhandelsgesellschaft [2010], not yet published. 
3 Paragraph 9a of the Federal Law on Unfair Competition of 1984 (Bundesgesetz gegen den 
unlauteren Wettbewerb 1984) (BGBl. I, 448/1984), as amended by BGBl. I, 136/2001 (‘the 
UWG’), reads: (1) Any person who, in carrying on a competitive commercial activity, 1. 
announces, in public advertisements or other communications destined for a large number 
of  persons,  that  he  is  granting  to  consumers  free  advantages  (bonuses)  associated  with 
products or services, or offers, announces or grants to consumers free advantages (bonuses) 
linked to periodicals or 2. proposes, announces or grants to undertakings free advantages 
(bonuses)  associated  with  products  or  services,  may  be  subject  to  an  action  for  an 
injunction and damages. That also applies where the gratuitous nature of that advantage is 
concealed by overall prices for the products or services, by fictitious prices for a bonus or in 
any other manner.  
See http://www.dbj.co.at/VorlesungBrugger/Vorlesung2009/neuntedoppelstunde.pdf, p. 13; 
Andreas  Wiebe,  Georg  Kodek,  Kommentar  zum  UWG:  Gesetz  gegen  den  unlauteren 
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proceeding to bring that practice to an end. Whereas that court upheld the 
application, the Oberlandesgericht Wien to which the case was referred on 
appeal held that the prohibition on sales with bonuses could apply only if 
the  gain  announced  was  capable  of  encouraging  the  public  to  buy  the 
newspaper. In the view of the appeals court, such an ‘attraction effect’ was 
not produced in this case, taking account in particular of the fact that the 
public could also participate in the competition via the internet4. In addition 
to consumer protection, the prohibition serves both to maintain effective 
competition and to protect media diversity. The opinions expressed by the 
European Commission were such that the general prohibition would act as a 
safety net and future-proof the directive5. By preventing competitors from 
outbidding one another with further ancillary benefits, it is intended above 
all to protect competitors who, because of their lesser economic resources, 
are not in a position to promote sales of their products by means of free 
bonuses. Such protection is justified in view of the importance of the media 
in forming opinions in a democratic society. The primary purpose of the 
Austrian  ‘prohibition  of  bonuses’  since  it  came  into  being  has  been  to 
prevent  the  purchasing  decision  of  consumers  being  influenced  non-
objectively  by  bonuses  and  the  real  price6  of  the main item from being 
hidden by the bonuses, such that the customer is misled. Earlier Austrian 
authorities referred to the Court to support the validity of national bans on 
combined offers. The Court held in connection with the compatibility with 
the free movement of goods of a Netherlands prohibition of bonuses that the 
offering of free gifts as a means of sales promotion may mislead consumers 
as to the real prices of certain products and distort the conditions on which 
genuine competition is based. The Court concluded that legislation which 
restricts or even prohibits such commercial practices for that reason is 
therefore capable of contributing to consumer protection and fair trading. 
 
 
III. 
 
Mediaprint then appealed (revision) on a point of law against the 
Handelsgericht Wien decision to the Oberster Gerichtshof. In its order for 
reference,  that  court  begins  by  observing  that  Paragraph  9a(1)(1)  of  the 
UWG  lays  down  a  general  prohibition  on  sales  with  bonuses,  which  is 
                                                 
4 One of the  most difficult challenges in the  future  will  be navigating the  various and 
disparate laws relating to the Internet throughout the world. For example, as American and 
European  concepts  of  individual  privacy  and  data  ownership  continue  to  diverge, 
transactions costs could increase, and some businesses may even be driven out of certain 
markets,  as  notes  Joshua  Sibble,  ‘Recent  Developments  in  Internet  Law’  (2011)  4 
Intellectual Property & Technology Law Journal  15. 
5  Giuseppe  Abbamonte,  ‘The  unfair  commercial  practices  directive  and  its  general 
prohibition’ in Stephen Weatherill, Ulf Bernitz (eds), The regulation of unfair commercial 
practices under EC Directive 2005/29: New rules and new techniques (Hart Publishing 
Oregon 2007) 11. 
6  Steffen Huck and Brian Wallace,  ‘The  impact  of  price  frames  on  consumer  decision 
making’  Office  of  Fair  Trading  May  2010 
<http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/economic_research/OFT1226.pdf>  (accessed  7  May 
2011). 4  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1: 1 
 
 
aimed at ensuring both the protection of consumers and the maintenance of 
effective competition. That having been stated, it is uncertain whether the 
Directive, which by contrast has as its objective the protection of consumers 
and exclusively governs relations between them and undertakings, precludes 
such a provision. The UWG ban includes exceptions that relieve the general 
prohibition:  Because  Subparagraph  1  above  shall  not  apply  where  the 
advantage consists in: an accessory currently used in association with the 
product or accessory services that are usual practice; samples; advertising 
objects  characterised  by  a  very  visible  and  durable  designation  of  the 
undertaking  which  makes  the  advertising;  advantages  of  low  value 
(bonuses) or minor objects of low value, provided the latter are not designed 
to form a collection the value of which exceeds the sum of the values of the 
various individual objects given; a given sum of money, or a sum to be 
calculated in  a given manner, which does not  accompany the product; a 
given quantity – or a quantity simply to be calculated by fraction – of the 
same product; the supply of information or advice or the granting of a right 
to  participate  in  a  competition7  in  which  the  value  of  the  individual 
participation ticket is located in a specific sum 8”. However, the court had 
doubts as to whether the prohibition referred to in Paragraph 9(a)(1) of the 
UWG is in compliance with Directive 2005/29. Therefore, the dispute in the 
main proceedings and the questions were referred for a preliminary ruling. 
 
 
IV. 
 
The  Oberster  Gerichtshof  therefore  stayed  the  proceedings  and 
referred the following questions to the Court for a preliminary ruling (art. 
267 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union9): Do Articles 3(1) 
and 5(5) of Directive 2005/29/EC or other provisions   of that Directive 
preclude a national provision which makes it illegal to announce, offer or 
give bonuses,  free  of charge,  with  periodicals  and  newspapers, and  to 
announce bonuses, free of charge, with other goods or services, apart from 
exhaustively  specified  exceptions,  without  it  being  necessary  in  any 
particular  case  to  consider  whether  such  a  commercial  practice  is 
misleading, aggressive or otherwise unfair, even where that provision serves 
not only to protect consumers, but also serves other purposes which are not 
covered by the material scope of the directive, for example, the maintenance 
of media diversity10 or the protection of weaker competitors11? The question 
                                                 
7 A promotional game, it does not apply to advantages accompanying periodicals. 
8 Calculated by dividing the total value of the prizes at stake by the number of participation 
tickets distributed does not exceed EUR 0.36 and the total value of the prize at stake does 
not  exceed  EUR  21  600;  that  may  be  done  only  by  means  of  the  advertiser’s  own 
participation tickets. 
9 OJ C 115/47 [2008].  
10  Brian  C  Hill  ’Measuring  media  market  diversity:  concentration,  importance,  and 
pluralism’  Federal  Communications  Law  Journal 
<http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb3073/is_1_58/ai_n29246845/>  (accessed  7  May 
2011). 
11 Robert Lande, Neil Averitt, ‘Consumer Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and 
Consumer Protection Law’ (1997) 2 Antitrust Law Journal 713; Robert Lande, Neil Averitt, 
‘Using the 'Consumer Choice' Approach to Antitrust Law’ (2007) 1 Antitrust Law Journal 
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may also be asked of whether the interpretation should be geared more to 
the  protection  of  existing  competitors  than  to  the  stimulation  of 
competition12. If the first question is answered in the affirmative: Is the 
chance of taking part in a prize competition, which is acquired with the 
purchase of a newspaper, an unfair commercial practice within the meaning 
of Article 5(2) of Directive 2005/29/EC merely because that chance is, for at 
least some of those to whom the offer is addressed, not the only, but the 
decisive  reason  for  purchasing  the  newspaper?’ By  its  first  question,  the 
referring court asks, in essence, whether the Directive must be interpreted as 
precluding a national provision which lays down a general prohibition on 
sales with bonuses and is designed not only to protect consumers but also 
pursues other objectives, such as, for example, the safeguarding of pluralism 
of the press and protection of the weakest competitors. In order to reply to 
the question referred, it is necessary first of all to determine whether sales 
with bonuses, which are the subject of the prohibition at issue in the main 
proceedings, constitute commercial practices within the meaning of Article 
2(d) of the Directive and are therefore subject to the rules laid down by that 
directive. 
 
 
V. 
 
The move towards principle-based rules in the Directive is likely to 
have a important impact on enforcers in the implementation stage13. The 
issue of fairness of business practices lies in the sphere of social relations, 
which is unsuitable for regulation so deep and of an overly -rigid casuistic 
scheme. The nature of the relationships covered by this regulation requires a 
flexible legal structure capable of adapting to the changing reality 14. Article 
2(d) of the Directive gives a particularly wide definition to the concept of 
commercial practices. It provides that business -to-consumer commercial 
practices means any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, 
commercial  communication  including  advertising  and  marketing,  by  a 
trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to 
consumers. The Directive  is characterised by a particularly wide scope of 
ratione  materiae  which  extends  to  any  commercial  practice  directly 
connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers. 
                                                 
12 Some experience from the United States in a recent Supreme Court case reveals that 
seventy  years  after  passage  of  the  American  regulation  (Robinson-Patman  Act),  courts 
remain  unable  to  reconcile  the  Act  with  the  basic  purpose  of  antitrust  laws  to  protect 
competition and consumer welfare. The language in the Act regarding competitive injury 
has resulted in the protection of competitors, at the expense of competition overall and 
consumer welfare. There is no point in further efforts to reconcile the Act with the antitrust 
laws in general, Deborah Garza, Jonathan Yarowsky, Bobby Burchfield, Stephen Cannon, 
Dennis Carlton, Makan Delrahim, Jonathan Jacobson, Donald Kempf, Stanford Litvack, 
John  Shenefield,  Debra  Valentine,  John  Warden,  Antitrust  Modernization  Commission 
Report and Recommendations (Stratford, Connecticut 2007) 322. 
13 C Twigg-Flesner, D  Parry, ‘The challenges posed by the implementation of the directive 
into domestic law— UK perspective’ in Stephen Weatherill, Ulf Bernitz (eds) (n 5) 215. 
14  R Stefanicki,  Prawo  reklamy  w  świetle  przepisów  ustawy  o  zwalczaniu  nieuczciwej 
konkurencji na tle prawnoporównawczym (Ars boni et aequi 2003) 59. 6  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1: 1 
 
 
The sixth recital of the Directive states: This Directive approximates the 
laws of the Member States on unfair commercial practices, including unfair 
advertising, which directly harm consumers’ economic interests and thereby 
indirectly  harm  the  economic  interests  of  legitimate  competitors.  In  line 
with the principle of proportionality, this Directive protects consumers from 
the  consequences  of  such  unfair  commercial  practices  where  they  are 
material but recognises that in some cases the impact on consumers may be 
negligible.  It  neither  covers  nor  affects  the  national  laws  on  unfair 
commercial practices which harm only competitors’ economic interests or 
which  relate  to  a  transaction  between  traders;  taking  full  account  of  the 
principle of subsidiarity, Member States will continue to be able to regulate 
such practices, in conformity with Community law, if they choose to do so. 
Promotional  campaigns,  such  as  those  at  issue  in  the  main  proceedings, 
which enable consumers to take part free of charge in a lottery subject to 
their purchasing a certain quantity of goods or services, clearly form part of 
an  operator’s  commercial  strategy  and  relate  directly  to  the  promotion 
thereof and its sales development. In all the judgments on the interpretation 
of Directive 2005/29 the Court of Justice found combined offers to be one 
of the practices covered by this act.  
 
 
VI. 
 
Since Directive 2005/29 fully harmonizes the rules relating to unfair 
business-to-consumer commercial practices, Member States may not adopt 
stricter  rules  than  those  provided  for  in  the  Directive,  even  in  order  to 
achieve a higher level of consumer protection15. The Court of Justice assigns 
fundamental importance to Art. 4 of the Directive16. It provides: Member 
States shall neither restrict the freedom to provide services nor restrict the 
free movement of goods for reasons falling within the field approximated by 
this Directive. The Court has consistently held that each of the Member 
States to which a directive is addressed is obliged to adopt, within the 
framework of its national legal system, all the measures necessary to ensure 
that the directive is fully effective, in accordance with the objective which it 
pursues. The implementation of the Directive needs to be seen in the context 
of the wider regulatory debate. The Court of Justice has traditionally held 
that the appropriate implementation of a Directive into domestic law does 
not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and 
verbatim in express, specific legislation. Rather, it is necessary that the 
national law brought into force to implement the Directive should meet the 
requirements of legal clarity and legal certainty in order to ensure that effect 
is given to the whole of the Directive’s programme when the national law is 
                                                 
15 Thus, for example Ch Wendehorst, B Zöchling-Jud, Verbraucherkreditrecht (Manzsche 
Verlags und Universitätsbuchhandlung 2010) 5. At the same time, the concept of complete 
harmonization is not fully transparent and clearly clarified, see Bartosz Kurcz, Dyrektywy 
Wspólnoty Europejskiej i ich implementacja do prawa krajowego (Zakamycze 2004) 86ff. 
16 Jules Stuyck, ‘The interaction between the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and 
Competition  Law’  in  R  Stefanicki  (ed)  Current  Tendencies  in  Consumer  Law 
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applied by the courts and authorities of the respective Member States17. In 
the interpretation of Directive 2005/29 the Court of Justice has consistently 
respected the requirements of complete harmonization. It should be noted 
that the prohibition in question of combined offers in the UWG constitutes a 
special rule which has no counterpart in Directive 2005/29. Because of the 
underlying rule-exception principle, the national provision has a different 
general  structure  from  Directive  2005/29.  It  is  first  and  foremost  this 
reversal of the general scheme which raises doubts as to c ompatibility with 
that Directive, the relevant factor being less the formal structure of the 
provision itself – if the national legislature is allowed a certain margin of 
discretion in connection with transposition – than the normative statement 
made in that national provision. It does not correspond substantively with 
the provisions of Directive 2005/29. 
 
 
VII. 
 
The Court of Justice, as did the Advocate General, took into account 
it  that  Article  5  of  Directive  2005/29  provides  that  unfair  commercial 
practices are to be prohibited and sets out the criteria on the basis of which 
practices  may  to  be  classified  as  being  unfair  when  interpreting  the 
regulatory structure of Directive. Article 5(1) prohibits unfair commercial 
practices. Article 5(2) sets out in detail what precisely is meant by ‘unfair’. 
It states that a commercial practice is unfair if, first, it is contrary to the 
requirements of ‘professional diligence’ and, second, it ‘materially distorts’ 
the  economic  behaviour  of  consumers.  Under  Article  5(4),  unfair 
commercial practices are, in particular, those which are misleading (Articles 
6 and 7) or aggressive (Articles 8 and 9)18. Article 5 refers to Annex I and 
the commercial practices listed there, which shall in all circumstances be 
regarded as unfair19. The same single list applies in all Member States 20. 
Also, recital 17 of the Directive states it is desirable that those commercial 
practices which are in all circumstances unfair be identified to provide 
greater legal certainty. Lists of unfair clauses  make it easier for traders, 
consumers, courts and other authorities to determine the meaning of the 
                                                 
17 Case C-96/95 Commission v Germany [1997] ECR I-1653; Commission v Italy (C-49/00) 
[2001] ECR I-8575; Commission v Italy (C-410/03) [2005] ECR I-3507. 
18 The level of detail in the ‘mini’ general clause turns it into an extensive set of precise 
rules,  leaving  little  scope  for  deviation  between  national  legal  systems.  Huge  Collins, 
‘Harmonization by example: European laws against unfair commercial practices’ (2010) 1 
Modern Law Review 103. 
19  Critical  remarks  on  the  black  list:  Gerain t  Howells,  ‘Co-regulation's  Role  in  the 
Development of European Fair Trading Laws’ in Huge Collins (ed), The Forthcoming EC 
Directive  on  Unfair  Commercial  Practices:  Contract,  Consumer  &  Competition  Law 
Implications (Kluwer Law International2004) 124; Jules Stuyck, Evelyne Terryn, Tom Van 
Dyck, ‘Confidence through fairness? The new directive on unfair business-to-consumer 
practices in the internal market’ (2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 130. 
20  About the possible assessment of the model: Norbert Reich,  ‘Full harmonization of EU 
consumer law – fiction or friction? – Some problem areas’ in Robert Stefanicki (ed) (n 16) 
145. The author discusses the issue of consequences of the full harmonization of the “black 
list” and possible paths to a grey list.  8  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1: 1 
 
 
general clause21. Annex I therefore contains a full list of all such practices. 
These are the only commercial practices which can be deemed to be unfair 
without a case-by-case assessment against the provisions of Articles 5 to 9. 
The list may only be modified by a revision of the Directive22. The Austrian 
authorities  have  raised  the  issue  of  the  protective  functions  of  the 
prohibition in the UWG. In addition to consumer protection, the prohibition 
serves both to maintain effective competition and to protect media diversity. 
By  preventing  competitors  from  outbidding  one  another  with  further 
ancillary  benefits,  it  is  intended  above  all  to  protect  competitors who, 
because of their more minimal economic resources, are not in a position to 
promote sales of their products by means of free bonuses. Such protection is 
justified in view of the importance of the media in forming opinions in a 
democratic society23. The court found that even if the national provision at 
issue in the main proceedings does essentially pursue the maintenance of 
pluralism of the press in Austria, it is important to note that the possibility of 
Member States maintaining or establishing in their territory measures which 
have as their aim or effect the classification of commercial practices as 
unfair on grounds relating to maintenance of the pluralism of the press does 
not appear amongst the derogations from the scope of the Directive set out 
in the sixth and ninth recitals and in Article 3 thereof. 
 
 
VIII. 
 
Even  if  exceptions  (Paragraph  9a(2)  of  the  UWG)  are  liable  to 
restrict the scope of the prohibition of commercial practices consisting in the 
linking of an offer of bonuses with the purchase of goods or services, the 
fact  remains  that, because of its  limited and pre-defined nature, such an 
exception cannot take the place of the analysis, which must of necessity be 
undertaken  having  regard  to  the  facts  of  each  particular  case,  of  the 
‘unfairness’ of a commercial practice in the light of the criteria set out in the 
Directive, where, as here in the main proceedings, that practice is not listed 
in Annex I thereto. Where a commercial practice falling within the scope of 
the Directive does not appear in Annex I to the latter, that practice can be 
regarded as unfair, and thus prohibited, only after a specific assessment, 
particularly in the light of the criteria set out in the Directive. The possibility 
of  participating  in  a  prize  competition,  linked  to  the  purchase  of  a 
                                                 
21 Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz, Jules Stuyck, Evelyne Terryn, Cases, Materials and Text on 
Consumer Law (Hart Publishing 2010) 591. 
22 The Member States are not allowed to extend the list of prohibited commercial practices 
contained  in  Annex  I.  Were  they  permitted  to  do  so,  that  would  have  the  effect  of 
circumventing  the  maximum harmonization  which  the Directive is  intended to achieve, 
thereby  frustrating  the  objective  of  legal  certainty, 
http://ochronakonsumenta.prawo.uni.wroc.pl/forum/index.php?topic=337.0;  Robert 
Stefanicki, Nieuczciwe praktyki handlowe w świetle prawodawstwa Unii Europejskiej – 
dyrektywa 2005/29 (Difin S.A. 2007) 203. 
23 Oliver Castendyk, Egbert Dommering, Alexander Scheuer, European media law (Kluwer 
Law International 2008) 53. As long as the rights of individuals are protected, it is the role 
of each State to decide how to form its public space, Lautsi and others v Italy, application 
no.  30814/06  (ECHR,  11  March  2011), 
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr/resources/hudoc/lautsi_and_others_v__italy.pdf  (accessed  7 
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newspaper,  does  not  constitute  an  unfair  commercial  practice  within  the 
meaning of Article 5(2) of the Directive, simply on the ground that, for at 
least some of the consumers concerned, that possibility of participating in a 
competition24  represents  the  factor  which  determines  them  to  buy  that 
newspaper. 
 
 
IX. 
 
On those grounds, the Court hereby rules: 1. Directive 2005/29/EC 
(…) must be interpreted as precluding a national provision, such as that at 
issue in the main proceedings, which lays down a general prohibition on 
sales with bonuses and is not only designed to protect consumers but also 
pursues  other  objectives;  2.  The  possibility  of  participating  in  a  prize 
competition, linked to the purchase of a newspaper, does not constitute an 
unfair commercial practice within the meaning of Article 5(2) of Directive 
2005/29,  simply  on  the  ground  that,  for  at  least  some  of  the  consumers 
concerned, that possibility of participating in a competition represents the 
factor which determines them to buy that newspaper. Basing the Directive 
on the model of complete harmonization and reduction of the personal scope 
of consumer protection can in its implementation lead to unfunctionality of 
the acquis EU law. In its Judgment of 11 March 201025 the Court of Justice 
held that: Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services and Directive  2002/22/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of   7 March 2002 on universal 
service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and 
services must be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as 
Article 57(1)(1) of the Polish Law on Telecommunications of 16 July 2004, 
in  the  version  applicable  to  the  facts  in  the  main  proceedings,  which 
prohibits making the conclusion of a contract for the provision of services 
contingent on the conclusion, by the end-user, of a contract for the provision 
of other services. However, Directive 2005/29/EC (…) must be interpreted 
as  precluding  national  legislation  which,  with  certain  exceptions,  and 
without  taking  account  of  the  specific  circumstances,  imposes  a  general 
prohibition of combined offers made by a vendor to a consumer.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The Commission had ambitious goals to include various spheres in 
the  model  of  complete  harmonization,  such  as  in  the  example  of  the  8 
                                                 
24  Some  economists  and  lawyers  further  contended  that  effective  competition  did  not 
require dozens of little firms, but instead could occur with relatively few firms in a market. 
If effective competition could occur without many small firms in a market, then courts did 
not need to interpret antitrust law to protect small businesses at the expense of consumers 
(Deborah Garza et al. (n 12) 34). 
25 Case C-522/08 Polish Telecom SA in Warsaw v President of the Office of Electronic 
Communications  not yet published. 10  Wroclaw Review of Law, Administration & Economics  [Vol 1: 1 
 
 
October  2008  Proposal  for  a  Consumer  Rights  Directive26. This attempt 
failed. The Commission's Proposal aims at simpl ifying and consolidating 
the existing legislation in the area of consumer contract law, on the basis of 
a fully harmonized set of key internal market aspects of consumer contract 
law. Contrary to the initial Commission proposal for full harmonization of 
EU legislation in all consumer rights fields, the Committee on the Internal 
Market and Consumer Protection of the European Parliament on 1 February 
2011 voted to adopt a mixed approach of minimum 27  and maximum28 
harmonization, which would fully harmonize areas   such as information 
requirements, delivery deadlines and a right of withdrawal from distance 
and off-premises sales. The aim is to ensure transparency for businesses and 
consumers, while leaving Member States free to retain higher standards in 
other areas, notably in relation to remedies for "lack of conformity" 29. In 
accordance with art. 4 of the text adopted at the sitting of the European 
Parliament  on  23  June  2011 30,  Member  States  may  not  maintain  or 
introduce, in their national law, provisions diverging  from those laid down 
in this Directive, including more or less stringent provisions to ensure a 
different level of consumer protection unless otherwise provided in this 
Directive. On the other hand, according to the Commission's proposal the 
policy option would strongly improve the quality of legislation and the level 
of consumer protection legislation, particularly in distance and off-premises 
transactions, as it would remove inconsistencies and loopholes by setting 
common rules and definitions31.  There has been a failure so far to codify at 
EU level the entirety of law regarding unfair competition, although this is a 
matter of prime importance both for the single market as well as for forming 
high  standards  of  consumer  protection.  From  this  perspective,  sp ecial 
importance should be assigned to Directive 2005/29, which in my opinion is 
one of the most important items of consumer legislation in European Union 
                                                 
26  Brigitta  Jud,  Christiane  Wendehorst,  Neuordnung  des  Verbraucherprivatrechts  in 
Europa? Zum Vorschlag einer Richtlinie über Rechte der Verbraucher (MANZ'sche 2009) 
2.  
27 Most recent judgement of the Court on 16 June 2011 in case  C-65/09 Gebr. Weber 
GmbH v Jürgen Wittmer, and C-87/09 Ingrid Putz v Medianess Electronics GmbH, not yet 
published. 
28  Most recent judgment of the Court on 12 May 2011 in Case C -122/10  I, not yet 
published. 
29 During the discussion the view is also raised that a general EU -wide harmonisation with 
a number of exceptions is necessary to create  transparency that would benefit businesses 
and consumers alike, by simplifying life for businesses and allowing them to expand their 
market shares while also ensuring broader choice, price competition and clarity on rights 
for consumers. Partly mandatory provisions of substantive laws that may only be modified 
in  favour  of  the  consumer:  Michael  Martinek, ‘Unsystematische  ￜberregulierung  und 
kontraintentionale Effekte  im Europäischen  Verbraucherschutzrecht oder:  Weniger  wäre 
mehr, in Systembildung und Systemlücken’ in Stefan Grundmann (ed), Kerngebieten des 
Europäischen Privatrechts (Mohr Siebeck 2000) 530.  
30 Report: Schwab (A7-0038/2011), P7_TA-PROV(2011) 0293.  
31  Commission staff working document accompanying t he proposal for a directive on 
consumer  right,  Impact  Assessment  Report, 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/rights/docs/impact_assessment_report_en.pdf  (accessed  7 
May 2011). 
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law in recent years. The principle of shared competence between the Union 
and the Member States applies in the area of consumer protection, so EU 
legislative measures should be carefully justified and necessary. The far-
reaching  consequences  discussed  in  the  paper  justifies  posing  questions 
about  the  best  level  of  consumer  protection  and  which  harmonization 
regime should be chosen for it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 